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What do a solar panel, a smart bomb, and a baseball bat have in common? They
all require rare earth elements to create/manufacture. The United States is widely
considered the hegemon of the world. The American economy, which was previously
hemorrhaging jobs, and is now growing anemically, is still larger, more balanced and
more advanced than its competitors, especially given the transition to and integration of
advanced technology. Its military prowess is unmatched by any two competing nations
combined, and its quality of life for its citizens remains one of the highest in the world.
Air planes, tanks, solar panels, plasma screen TVs, smart phones; all conceived and
designed in the United States. The small problem rests with rare earth metals. This
collection of minerals that nobody has ever heard of are critical to building most of the
high tech gadgets, appliances, and machinery that makes the United States what it is
today, and that increasingly look to shape the future economically and militarily.
The stumbling block stands that the only large scale, commercially viable
producer of these minerals is the People‟s Republic of China. After flooding the market
to put their competition out of business in the early 1990s, China has systemically
gained control over the entire sector of the economy concerning these minerals.
Between 90% and 100% of all current commercially viable rare earth production occurs
in China. As Deng Xiaoping declared in the 1970s, rare earth metals are to China as oil
has become for many Middle Eastern nations; a resource to center economic growth
around, and use as a tool of statecraft internationally that can demand respect and
result in important concessions. Access to these critical minerals, which are not only
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important in the petroleum refining process, but key to most current alternative energy
sources, a plethora of new military applications, and basic consumer goods, will define
the coming generation. Current American responses are limited and not commercially
viable. The question stands however; how should the United States respond to these
challenges, and move forward into the 21st century with its energy security and
economic competitiveness intact? Can we mine our way out of this conundrum, or will
our financial might prove useless in the face of an equal on the global market?
More importantly, does a question such as this force us to critically re-examine
how we engage in the international arena? The complex interdisciplinary nature of the
problem presented in this paper brings to the forefront the current consensuses that are
shaping international relations today, and highlight the US-China relationship. The
relationship between these two nations, widely viewed as pivotal to the direction of the
21st century, is currently dominated by rival camps divided by ideology and special
interest, and less by what is actually going on within the People‟s Republic. The rare
earth question presents a unique challenge to current solutions to the problem, which
are largely couched in a realist worldview. Given that the US-China relationship is at the
forefront of the debate concerning rare earths, a re-evaluation of how the U.S. engages
with China is of paramount importance. Current interpretations are lacking, and in
many cases detrimental, both to the overall relationship, and to the rare earth question.
Is the solution new wine in an old realist, national security bottle? Or does the rare earth
question force us to reconsider the very nature of security?
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Section One: What Are We Talking About?
What is a rare earth metal? Good question. Survey the average American on the
street, and they won‟t know. Some people will guess minerals like uranium or platinum,
which stole headlines a few years ago with civil wars and violent upheavals occurring
around the only major production sites such as in Africa, but they would be wrong.
Sadly, the average citizen can‟t name a single one, let alone point them out on the
periodic table.
A “rare earth” metal or element is one of seventeen elements that are at the
bottom of the periodic table. “Rare Earths” is a term of art referring to these specific
metals, some of which aren‟t entirely that rare. The term excludes elements like
platinum, which are quite rare, but are referred to separately. Rare earth elements are
often found in large deposits that have many different elements in the same deposit.
One of the tricks to extracting and mining rare earth elements is the ability to separate
them from one another. Rare earth metals are roughly divided into two categories,
“light” and “heavy,” which are usually found together.
In alphabetical order:
Cerium (Ce) is a commonly available element, and is easily accessible because it
can be found high in the earth‟s crust. A significant advantage over most other rare earth
metals is that cerium enjoys is that it is easy to process and refine, and by extension,
use.1 Its availability is a major factor in low prices for cerium on commodity markets.
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Cerium has been found to be useful in a variety of ways, such as being a critical agent in
polishing and making UV ray blocking glass, the production of catalytic converters,
(used to reduce the pollution that comes from car emissions), as well as in re-chargeable
batteries.2 Similar to Scandium, Cerium is used for the production of energy efficient
fluorescent and compact fluorescent light bulbs. As alternative energy demands
increase, demand for Cerium will increase as it also serves a critical role in the creation
of hydrogen fuel cells. 3
Dysprosium - (Dy) is, according to the US Department of Energy, the most
critical mineral resource to the United States because of its utility in clean energy
technology and the vulnerability and shortness of its supply.4 Recent increases in the
demand for hybrid car production has strained supplies of Dysprosium even more. This
will push up the price of the mineral on the commodity markets, increasing the cost of
green technologies such as hybrid cars. The problem with Dysprosium is largely that it
is not always found with other rare earths, so while a nation may produce a large
amount of rare earths, in terms of tons produced, they may not have any mines that
contain dysprosium.5 The world‟s commercial supplies are exclusively in China. Even if
other nations start producing large amounts of “rare earth metals,“ access to this
specific metal will remain in the hands of the Chinese until a new source is found, if it
even exists. The key is that small amounts of dysprosium prevent corrosion and increase
the strength of magnets. Dysprosium based magnets are small, lightweight, and
extremely powerful; necessary in the creation of things like computers, ipods, and smart
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phones.6 It is also needed for hybrid car engines, wind power turbines, computer
memory chips and portable storage devices.
Erbium (Er) is a relatively scarce REE, with the unique properties that can absorb
loose neurons very effectively, making it a somewhat successful substitute for
Holmium.7 Like Holmium, Erbium is used in nuclear power plants as control rods. It is
also used in fiber optic cables for amplifying lasers to magnify the signal. Other uses
include in welding, as a pink colorant in glass and ceramics, and dermatology.8
Europium (Eu) is both rare and expensive. The demand far exceeds the supply,
even of current applications, not to mention potential uses. Europium is used, along
with yttrium, to create red phosphors for televisions and computer screens, as well as
energy efficient lighting.9 Most people use products with Europium every day without
knowing it, and the outlook is bleak to maintain current levels of supply.
Gadolinium (Gd) has a wide array of uses related to radioactive material,
including radiation shielding in nuclear reactors in power plants. On a smaller scale, it is
also used for MRI machines and X-rays in doctor‟s offices, CDs, and, like other rare
earths, for phosphors for television and computer screens (in this case, for the color
green).10 Research has shown that Gadolinium might have a future as a way to replace
HFCs in chemical refrigeration, which would reduce the environmental impact of the
chemical cooling process. 11
Holmium (Ho) is one of the rarest rare earths, and is also has the strongest
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magnetic attraction of any element, “rare earth” or not. In deposits where it actually
exists, it usually makes up less than two percent of the amalgamated minerals in the
mine. 12Holmium, despite its rareness, is very important to modern society. Most
importantly, holmium‟s ability to absorb large amounts of stray neutrons makes them
valuable for nuclear control rods in nuclear power plants. Other uses include in lasers
used for surgery and dentistry, and in fiber optics.13 Other applications of holmium are
not being researched because of the scarcity of the mineral.
Lanthanum (La) is one of the most available rare earth elements, and the most
recognizable of the entire list. Lanthanum often composes between twenty and forty
percent of rare earth deposits, and is therefore not in short supply, although that could
change, given that it has a wide range of applications. Commercially, it is used in
producing fiber optic cables, high intensity light projection, such as in movie theaters,
various types of sensors, electron microscopes, and other consumer electronics. 14 The
largest uses for Lanthanum, however, are in energy production and green technology. It
is a rechargeable batteries, such as those in hybrid cars, cameras, and gaming console
controllers, as well as in the refinement of petroleum to create gasoline. 15
Lutetium (Lu) is another extremely scarce mineral, with world production
averaging 10 metric tons per year.16 This scarcity has made this mineral very expensive
in commodity markets. Lutetium is useful as a chemical catalyst for the petroleum
refining process, and can be used in cancer treatment and in PET scans.17 If the supply
increased, Lutetium could be used for computer memory chips, phosphors, and further
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uses in medicine to save lives.
Neodymium (Nd) is another of the most important rare earth elements,
especially for green technology. Neodymium is the most important rare earth in the
manufacturing of high strength types of permanent magnets. These magnets are critical
to modern high tech applications in all sectors of the economy, from cell phones,
medical imaging devices, floppy and flash drives for computers, satellites, hybrid cars,
and wind turbines.18 Thankfully, Neodymium is one of the most highly concentrated and
available of the rare earth elements. Given its large array of uses, demand for
Neodymium is also high, and will grow exponentially with the transition to green energy
production.
Praseodymium (Pr) is both rare, and easy to find. Praseodymium is found in
almost all large rare earth deposits, but never in large amounts. The supply of
Praseodymium is not a large problem, despite its rarity because there are relatively few
applications, such as permanent magnets, coloring glass and ceramics, and some
batteries.19 The demand for Praseodymium is rapidly increasing in demand, as scientists
find new uses for its magnetic properties.
Promethium (Pm) is one of the rarest elements around. (only about ½ a kilogram
has been found in the earth‟s crust).20 This radioactive element exists as an intermediate
stage of radioactive decay of other elements. Demand for this element is non-existent
given that it is virtually unusable. The element is mostly produced in laboratories from
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nuclear waste that is being re-processed.21
Samarium (Sm) is heavily mined, but relatively scarce, rare earth. Samarium is
primarily used, like neodymium, for the production of high strength permanent
magnets. Samarium-cobalt magnets are somewhat weaker than neodymium magnets,
but resist degradation and exposure to high temperatures much more effectively
(Samarium magnets can withstand temperatures over 700 degrees C).22 Other
applications for Samarium include cancer fighting drugs, lasers, and control rods for
nuclear power plants.23 The demand for Samarium will increase significantly as super
conductors begin to be used more.
Scandium (Sc) is one of the least known or utilized of the rare earth metals. What
little Scandium that is produced is used by sports equipment manufacturers for things
like aluminum baseball bats, and by the aerospace industry, as a key component in
aluminum and titanium alloys.24 Adding Scandium makes metal alloys lighter, without
reducing the strength of the metal.
Terbium (Tb) is quite rare, and is one of the primary elements that the world
supply is grossly inadequate to meet demand. Terbium has potent uses in fuel cell
technology, which could be used to replace many modern fuel sources.25 Terbium is the
single most important element in the construction of fluorescent light bulb. This is the
main source of its demand, and this is expected to grow substantially both due to
cultural and legislative changes.26 Other uses include serving as a yellow or green
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phosphor in computer monitors and televisions.
Thulium (Tm) is exceedingly rare, the rarest of the rare earth elements. Like
Promethium (Pr), it is so rare, so there aren‟t many uses for this element, and there is no
real issues of supply and demand.27 Uses for thulium exist, if it could be produced in
higher quantities.
Ytterbium (Yb) is one of the few rare earth elements that is found more
plentifully outside of China than inside it. Large deposits exist in Canada and Malaysia,
but these are not being heavily exploited, leaving the Chinese in charge of the world
supplies.28 This lack of supply has curtailed the current use of this mineral, but the
potential is almost endless. Ytterbium is an important component in solar electric cells,
steel alloys, lasers, anti-forgery inks, night vision goggles, and stress measurement
technology.29
Yttrium (Y) is one of the rarer of the rare earth elements. This frequently results
in shortages as supply remains spotty and short. The trouble is that Yttrium is used for a
variety of important uses. Originally used solely to create the phosphors needed for the
color red in televisions, Yttrium is now used for high powered lasers, and energy
efficient LED light bulbs. It is also used for optical lenses and other types of glass, to
fortify ceramics, and in cancer fighting drugs. 30
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Section Two: What Can Rare Earths Do For You?
“To truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from
the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the
profitable kind of energy.” Barack Obama‟s address to a joint session of Congress Feb.
24, 2009 underscores a new mindset that has taken hold in at least western nations;
“going green.”32 On the surface, this means shifting towards alternative and renewable
sources of energy from oil, coal, and natural gas, increasing recycling, the use of energy
efficient light bulbs, and more sustainable agricultural processes. New forms of energy,
solar panels, wind turbines, and hydrogen cells are the heart of this movement, with
little regard to the impact of the technology involved.33 Even in the status quo, rare
earths are needed in the refinement of petroleum, making them necessary for our
current energy needs. “Since 2005, global investments in clean energy have grown by
more than 230%, with worldwide investment in 2009 totaling more than $162billion.
Projections for 2010 show that these investments could increase by 25%, reaching
roughly $200 billion by the year's end”34 This shift is large, growing, and here to stay,
defining energy and economic policy for the near future.35
The shift to alternative energy is not random; a myriad of reasons exist to prefer
cleaner, renewable forms of energy, anything that isn‟t natural gas, coal, or petroleum
based. Despite what the American right wants everyone to believe, global warming is
anthropogenic, and a danger to humanity. As the recent events in Japan have
demonstrated, the first wave of supposedly clean energy, nuclear power, is not the ideal
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solution. Nuclear power plants can‟t solve emissions from personal and commercial
vehicles, not to mention the continuing issues with the radio-active waste from spent
uranium.
Dependence on fossil fuels has its own drawbacks, before considering
environmental concerns. Oil has become a must-have resource in the United States
economy, and thus the United States is somewhat dependent on those with the capacity
to produce oil for economic sustainability. This has proven to be true, as policies that
anger oil producing countries have caused oil embargoes in the past, such as during the
presidency of Jimmy Carter and OPEC. Even if there isn‟t an actual embargo, instability
in the Middle East can cause prices to skyrocket, such as during the Arab Spring and the
recent Libyan intervention.36 If four dollar gas is expensive enough to become a political
hot button issue, doubling or tripling the price would leave the United States destitute.
When the United States tries to find sources of oil outside of the traditional
Middle Eastern nations, the political conundrum, and instability remains the same, if
not worse. Rebel groups frequently cause the price of Nigerian oil to go up, a problem
that plagues all African oil producing nations.37 Venezuela produces oil in the Western
Hemisphere, but Hugo Chavez is quite happy to use oil as political leverage against the
United States.38 The United States is putting more and more sanctions on Iran for its
nuclear weapons program, and Israel is contemplating a first strike as its cyber-attacks
against the Iranian nuclear program seem to have been unable to stop their progress.
Neither of these actions is conducive to purchasing cheap, reliable oil from the Middle
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East. Indeed, the financial effects of oil dependence in the Middle East are themselves
destabilizing.39
Russia has large reserves, but has proven quite happy to use energy as a political
tool, such as when it cut off natural gas supplies over a political disagreement with the
Ukraine.40 Despite the START treaty, and other goodwill measures, Putin immediately
blames the United States for recent protests over recent election. US Russian relations
are rocky at best, and volatile, even after substantial good will measures.41 While Canada
and some of the Nordic states do produce oil, they hardly have the capacity to meet all of
the United States‟ need for oil, nor should any one nation be so dependent on one
source, even if they are considered reliable and friendly.
The burning of fossil fuels, usually for energy production, has been directly
attributed with the spread of global warming.42 Despite the political battles about its
existence, and the clever wording that tries to hide the impact of a heating planet in the
fuzzy frame of “climate change,” thousands of peer reviewed, qualified scientists
generally agree that global warming is indeed happening, and that it is to an extent
anthropogenic.43 Large scale global warming could be catastrophic, dramatically
changing global society as we know it.44 Polar ice caps would melt killing species, and
sea levels will rise world-wide; New York, London, Beijing, the world‟s largest economic
hubs, will struggle to hold back the tides.45 Coastal plains will be gone.46 Next to go will
be ports, transportation infrastructure, and productive farmland.47 Extreme weather
patterns would become the norm.48 The world‟s oceans will acidify, biodiversity will be
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reduced, and volcanic activity will increase dramatically.49 This chaos will result in mass
migrations.50 These will cause resource conflicts that will be difficult to resolve
rationally.51 The time nears to effectively challenge the escalation of global warming‟s
effects.52 Alternatives to the status quo must be available and cost-effective.53 Reducing
the cost of alternative energy is key to providing the incentives necessary to get the
Chinese, Indians, and other large and growing economies on board, so that their
economic growth can continue with little interference while they curtail their emissions.
The United States and others must have the rare earth metals to build such alternatives,
dramatically change the culture and standard of living that its citizens enjoy, or find yet
other solutions that don‟t require rare earth metals.54 With a culture change of the
magnitude required improbable, and the reliance on science that hasn‟t been thought up
yet a less than idea option, the short term answer becomes evident.
Ironically, the very technologies that are reputed to save the world from global
warming have their own environmental consequences. In short, „green tech‟ requires
toxic processes to function. To build any of the leading “green” technologies, increasing
amounts of rare earth metals are required.55 The mining, extraction, and processing of
these metals presents a new environmental challenge; one that has been swept under
the rug. In China, these environmental consequences are already being felt, with
farmers in China and the water supplies for their farms being poisoned with mineral
runoff that can be radioactive.56 The implications of these policies include the impact of
the rare earth metal industry on the surrounding areas, and their residents,
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guaranteeing access to these minerals to build these technologies, and the movement of
scientists/engineers and businesses to China.
Given the world‟s total energy production, alternative energy still constitutes a
small fraction of the whole. In terms of rare earth metals, supply has at least reasonably
met demand, but this is rapidly changing. As more technologies become commercially
viable, and more nations join the green revolution, this demand is sure to skyrocket.
Corresponding increases in supply are much more questionable, especially considering
export restrictions and political implications, as well as overall extraction and
refinement rates. 57
For example, solar power has been touted as a new, clean, renewable technology
that can help power houses and businesses individually, and also done in massive
energy farms in regions that receive a lot of daily sun. Solar power converts energy from
the sun, which isn‟t likely to run out of its heat any time soon. Rare Earth Metal indium
is used to build thin-film solar panels. Using indium, because of its versatile properties,
allows solar to be used in new and smaller places. Older or larger scale solar projects use
tellurium, which also has restricted supplies. Substitutes for these two rare earths have
distinctively lower energy conversion rates. 58
Another recent example is the so-called “light bulb law,” so dubbed by
conservative small government, anti-regulation American politicians who recently failed
to overturn it, a 2007 law set in motion the transition from the tradition light bulbs that
16

our parents had grown up with, towards much more efficient, energy conservative
bulbs.59 These bulbs will dramatically reduce the average household„s energy use, but
perceptively cost more due the individual on the shelf costs, as savings on energy bills
aren„t easily seen or itemized.60 The drawback is that these bulbs require rare earth
metals, which give them their distinct advantage over previous light bulb designs.
Putting cutting edge light bulbs in every fixture across the United States will not only
dramatically increase the demand for certain rare earth elements, but will also increase
the challenge of securing enough rare earths to meet demands. The specific elements in
question for energy efficient lighting are lanthanum, cerium, europium, terbium and
yttrium. 61
Rare earth metals are everywhere, often not more than a trace of them serving
vital functions in modern technology. It is estimated that the judicious application of
rare earth metals can reduce global emissions from cooling and storing food, and lead to
magnetic refrigeration. Rare earth metal neodymium is used widely as miniaturized
permanent magnets in hybrid motors and windmill turbines, including in the batteries
and motors of the Toyota Prius and the Chevy Volt.62 The list of their uses in the field of
green technology is practically endless. The troubling trend is that 95% of world
production is found in China, and businesses are increasingly moving to the source of
their materials. 63
In 2003, China produced only one percent of the world's solar panels but by
2009 its share rose to 43 percent. By contrast, since 2003, U.S. production of solar
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panels fell from 14 percent to just four percent of the world's total.63 In 2009, the
Chinese government announced restrictions on the export of rare earths, ostensibly to
encourage investment within China of industries using the metals. The rare earths
neodymium and lanthanum are essential to the newest generation of batteries that
power new hybrid and electric vehicles, U.S. auto companies are, in part, placing their
hope in revitalizing the domestic auto industry on China's continued good will. 64
Whether for the rare earths themselves or for final products made from them,
import dependency in the face of such a high concentration of production would do little
to alleviate energy security concerns now seen in terms of import dependency on the
Middle East for oil. The political calculation becomes complicated, is a rare earth
dependency better or worse than an oil dependency? In some ways, it is, because there
are approximately 90 nations that export oil, and while many are in OPEC, and have
sources of concern, such as those listed above, it is still better than dependence on a
single source (for the foreseeable future), China. 65
The implications of a rare earth shortage aren‟t strictly related to the
environment, and energy dependence, but have distinct military implications as well
that could threaten the position of the United States world‟s strongest military. The
United States place in the world was assured by powerful and decisive deployments in
World War One and World War Two. Our military expansion was built upon a large,
powerful industrial base that created more, better weapons of war for our soldiers.
During the World Wars, a well-organized draft that sent millions of men into battle in a
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short amount of time proved decisive, but as the war ended, and soldiers drafted into
service returned to civilian life, the U.S. technological superiority over its opponents
provided it with sustained dominance over its enemies, even as the numerical size of the
army declined. New technologies, such as the use of the airplane in combat, rocket
launched missiles, radar systems, and later, GPS, precision guided missiles, missile
defense systems, high tech tanks, lasers, and other technologies now make the
difference between victory and defeat.66
The United States military now serves many important functions, deterring
threats across the world. The United States projects its power internationally, through a
network of bases and allied nations. Thus, the United States is a powerful player in all
regions of the world, and often serves as a buffer against conflict in these regions.67 US
military presence serves as a buffer against Chinese military modernization in Eastern
Asia, against an increasingly nationalist Russia in Europe, and smaller regional actors,
such as Venezuela in South America and Iran in the Middle East. 68 The U.S. Navy is
deployed all over the world, as the guarantor of international maritime trade routes.69
The US Navy leads action against challenges to its maritime sovereignty on the other
side of the globe, such as current action against Somali piracy.70 Presence in regions
across the world prevents escalation of potential crisis.71 These could result in either a
larger power fighting a smaller nation or nations (Russia and Georgia, Taiwan and
China), religious opponents (Israel and Iran), or traditional foes (Ethiopia and Eretria,
Venezuela and Colombia, India and Pakistan). 72 US projection is also key deterring
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emerging threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.73 While not direct
challenges to US primacy, both terrorism and nuclear proliferation can kill thousands. 74
The US Air Force has a commanding lead over the rest of the world, in terms of
both numbers and capabilities. American ground forces have few peers, and are
unmatched in their ability to deploy to anywhere in the world at an equally unmatched
pace. 75
The only perceived challenge to the United States militarily comes from the
People‟s Republic of China.76 While the United States outspends all other nations in the
world put together in terms of military spending, China follows as a close second, and
has begun an extensive modernization program to boot.77 The Chinese military however,
is several decades behind the United States in air power and nuclear capabilities.78 To
compensate, China has begun the construction of access-denial technology, preventing
the US from exercising its dominance in China‟s sphere of influence.79 Chinese
modernization efforts have a serious long-term advantage over the United States; access
to rare earth metals, and a large concentration of rare earth chemists doing research.80
This advantage, coupled with the U.S. losing access to rare earth metals, will even the
odds much quicker than policymakers had previously anticipated. 81
The largest example is US airpower. With every successive generation of military
aircraft, the U.S. Air Force becomes more and more dependent on Rare Earth Metals.82
As planes get faster and faster, they have to get lighter and lighter, while adding weight
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from extra computers and other features on board.83 To lighten the weight of the plane,
scandium is used to produce lightweight aluminum alloys for the body of the plane. Rare
Earth metals are also useful in fighter jet engines, and fuel cells.84 For example, rare
earths are required to producing miniaturized fins, and samarium is required to build
the motors for the F-35 fighter jet.85 F-35 jets are the next generation fighter jet that
works together to form the dual plane combination that cements U.S. dominance in air
power over the Russian PAK FA.86
Rare earth shortages don‟t just affect air power, also compromising the
navigation system of Abrams Tanks, which need samarium cobalt magnets. The Abrams
Tank is the primary offensive mechanized vehicle in the U.S. arsenal. The Aegis Spy 1
Radar also uses samarium.87 Many naval ships require neodymium. Hell Fire missiles,
satellites, night vision goggles, avionics, and precision guided munitions all require rare
earth metals. 88
American military superiority is based on technological advancement that
outstrips the rest of the world. Command and control technology allows the U.S. to fight
multiple wars at once and maintain readiness for other issues, as well as have
overwhelming force against rising challengers. This technology helps the U.S. know
who, where, and what is going to attack them, and respond effectively, regardless of the
source of the threat.
Rare Earth Elements make this technological superiority possible.
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To make matters worse, the defense industrial base is often a single market
industry, dependent on government contracts for its business. If China tightens the
export quotas further, major US defense contractors will be in trouble.89 Every sector of
the defense industrial base is dependent on rare earth metals. Without rare earths, these
contractors can‟t build anything, which collapses the industry.90
Rare Earth shortages are actually already affecting our military, with shortages of
lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium happening in the status quo. This
prevents us not only from building the next generation of high tech weaponry, but also
from constructing more of the weapons and munitions that are needed in the status quo.
As current weapon systems age and they can‟t be replaced, the US primacy will be
undermined. Of special concern is that U.S. domestic mining doesn‟t produce “heavy”
rare earth metals that are needed for many advanced components of military
technologies. Given the nature of many military applications, substitutions aren‟t
possible. 91
Additional concern should be placed on the effects that this has on the economy.
As mentioned above, rare earth metals are necessary in virtually every important sector
of the economy, from health and energy to commercial electronics and aerospace and
other high-tech manufacturing. Shortages of rare earth metals make every one of these
products more expensive, as the cost of the materials will invariably trickle down to the
consumers. Cost increases could make some of these industries unprofitable, causing
layoffs. More importantly, the perception of a shortage in these areas could be equally as
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devastating as an actual shortage. The free market economy is very susceptible to the
manipulations of government-based corporations in China. A proposed solution-to refer
China to the WTO-is unlikely to settle economic jitters, and could even worsen the
situation because of retaliation from China.92
The shift of many industries that use rare earth metals to China creates a
structural barrier to long-term US economic health and competitiveness.93 The
traditional narrative to explain American economic prosperity is the entrepreneurial
spirit, creating the products of tomorrow. If the companies responsible for doing this
leave the United States, then this recipe for success will no longer be viable.94
The current economic climate, complicated by the European debt crisis caused by
Greece, Spain, Italy and others, economic stagnation in Japan, and instability in the oil
markets and the Middle East, has put people on edge, and introduced great volatility
into the stock markets, the confidence of investors, and everyday consumers. Some
executives are even more worried about the rare earth shortage than the debt crisis,
seeing it as a structural issue that doesn‟t have any easy or immediately foreseeable
solution. 95
Rare earth mining and the associated industries are actually very good for a
national economy, a fact that diversifying the source could severely hurt. Rare earth
mining is considered a multibillion dollar industry, and the industries that rely upon it
are considered worth more than 4.8 trillion dollars. 96Downstream industries
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encompass the majority of the world‟s jobs and wealth. China is currently trapped in a
demographic crisis, as large numbers of young college graduates are expecting high
paying jobs as they enter the workforce, and the industries related to rare earths give
them a convenient source of high wage careers. The Chinese model of maintaining high
economic growth-to offset social tensions, is currently dependent on rare earths and
their downstream industries, at least in part. China will need approximately 300 million
jobs by 2020, which will help rebalance their economy to be less export driven. 97
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Section Three: What Happened?
Before we get to the proposed solutions, it is necessary to examine how the
United States got into this mess. The first rare earth element-although they weren‟t
called that at the time-was discovered in a mine in Sweden in the early 1700s. Beyond
the unique and at the time unappreciated chemical properties of these elements, little
scientific study was put into them, or investment into their extraction and refinement.
In the 1830s and 40s, Carl Gustav Mosander, a Swedish chemist, using primitive
techniques, separated Terbium, Cerium, Lanthanum, and Yttrium. Over the next 60
years, various elements were isolated by individuals around Europe, but there was a
large amount of confusion, as different elements were given different names, and the
methods of isolating them remained primitive. 98
The Manhattan Project changed the face of geopolitical calculations, and gave the
world the nuclear weapon. As a result of their experimentation, the scientists involved
created ion exchange procedures in which to isolate specific elements. This procedure
can be used on uranium for the nuclear devices, but also can be used to identify and
isolate rare earth metals.99 In the 1950s, more specialized methods of extraction and
separation developed, making commercial applications for some rare earth metals
practical.100
Until WWII, Brazil and British India gathered what little rare earth metals that
were used from surface deposits. These were in non-commercial quantities, and only
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contained a handful of the spectrum of rare earth elements, as by this point several
elements had yet to be discovered. 101
After WWII, production shifted to South Africa, a country that found a deposit of
ore in another one of its mines. As the 1950s turned into the 1960s, American
businesses embraced the newly opened Mountain Pass Mine in California, which would
lead the world in rare earth production, eliminating most competitors until the mid
1980s. The mine had a large supply of light rare earth metals, and trace amounts of the
other elements that had commercial uses, and dominated the market until the early
1990s.102
Both the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration‟s increased
environmental regulations hampered operations and increased mineral costs produced
in the United States. The emergence of Chinese production in the Inner Mongolia region
collapsed the prices of rare earths. Facing low prices and high costs from environmental
regulations, the Mountain Pass Mine closed in 2002, yielding the market to the Chinese.
This was hardly headline news, and went unnoticed in the United States. The Chinese
however, had other plans. 103
Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping saw rare earth metals as a tool of economic
growth, and strategic benefit as his nation emerged from the ravages of Maoism.104
China was weak, over-populated, largely agricultural, and had few industries or exports
of note.105 Deng, using the Middle Eastern oil mogul-states as an example, put in place
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state policies to invest heavily in the long term production, refinement, and eventual
domination of the rare earth market.106 Xiaoping‟s goal was to leverage Chinese control
of the rare earth market to both increase the price of the mineral, and thus increase
profits for his growing economy, and to lure the industries that depend on the minerals
to produce their increasingly high tech goods to Chinese soil.107
These additional revenues could then be reinvested in other sectors of the
economy.108 This creates high tech jobs, and would help transform China from the land
of sweatshops producing chachkas for Wal-Mart, to a high-tech powerhouse that led the
world in the newest fields of innovation. Rare earth related industries contributed to the
„rise of China‟ as we know it today.
His plan worked. While Americans ignored the collapse of what they saw as an
outdated relic from the environmentally destructive and labor intensive past that had no
place in the information age, the Chinese cheered that they now controlled the ability to
produce all of the devices the rest of the world was so dependent on for the information
revolution.109
China now produces between 95% and 100 % of every rare earth element,
cornering the market of every rare earth element.110 The Chinese business model
worked, and they current sit astride the market.111 The world will, for now, have to live
with Chinese domination of rare earth production.113
The Chinese however, do not have a monopoly on rare earth deposits.113 Only
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37% of world deposits of rare earth elements, obviously somewhat variant based on the
specific element, reside in China. While that is a large quantity given the relative land
mass of China compared to the rest of the planet, it is still far less than half the world‟s
supply.114 The main monopolies that the Chinese currently enjoy are not only mineral
production based; the Chinese have monopolies on the world‟s rare earth refining, and
as to today are the only nation that can commercially mass produce rare earth metals in
sufficient quantities to meet global demand.115 They also have a huge lead in rare earth
chemistry, and in training scientists to work with rare earths. (The United States has a
single university with a degree in rare earth chemistry, Colorado State School of
Mining).116
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Section Four: The Scramble
The challenges to Chinese dominance are many. In Australia, the Mount Weld
and Nolan projects are perhaps the farthest along, and are able to compete in a limited
manner with their Chinese equivalents.117 Lynas Corp, the Australian company that
dominates the rare earth sector down under, is currently negotiating to build the first
refinery for rare earth metals outside of China, in Malaysia.118 If successful, the refinery
in Malaysia will be able to support about 1/6 of the world market, the first significant
detraction from Chinese dominance in a decade.119 The refinery, however, has been the
subject of ongoing controversy.120 The Malaysian government has been strict with Lynas
on the environmental standards of the plant, and, after the Fukushima incident,
widespread protests led to the Malaysian government to revoke Lynas‟s permits.121
Residents around the proposed plant recall a now defunct Mitsubishi plant that caused
leukemia, birth defects and a poisoning of the local soil and water supplies in the
surrounding villages.122 After an IAEA inspection, the plant resumed work, but long
term plans for the storage of radioactive thorium remain elusive.123
Japan has discovered large deposits of rare earths under the ocean in its
territorial waters, and is in the process of exploring how to mine minerals at the
considerable depth in question.124 Japan, a producer of high tech materials, considers
itself very vulnerable to a rare earth metal shutoff, and has signed an agreement with
Vietnam and India, to pool and coordinate their rare earth policies in an effort to reduce
their vulnerability.125 This arrangement is still in its infancy, as neither India nor
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Vietnam can produce enough rare earth metals yet to make a meaningful impact on
global markets. Vietnam‟s Lai Chau province has a reasonable amount of rare earth
metals, but this province borders China, an additional security concern if relations sour
in the region.126
Historical producers South Africa and Brazil are returning to the game, investing
in their mining facilities, seeking to provide a cost effective alternative to Chinese
domination, and hopefully a share of the high tech industries that have sprung up in
China, which could catapult their economies forward in a similar fashion to the Chinese.
Estonian production at Sillamae, processing the result of decades of uranium and other
minerals, unintentionally unearthed tons of rare earths, which are now being exported.
Estonian exports are estimated at about 3,000 tons a year, or 2% of the world‟s
supplies.127
One of the most controversial sources of rare earth metals is Afghanistan. Once
accused of invading Iraq for to secure oil reserves, the United States is now drawing
criticism for trying to lock up the next critical resource, rare earths, by using its position
in the nation to gain favorable mining contracts.128 The evidence from these accusations
seems slim, due to a large contract awarded to the Chinese by the Karzai administration
to mine rare earths in the nation.129 Criticism from the other side of the political
spectrum has emerged, pointing towards a failure of leadership that let the Chinese
secure access to this critical resource outside of their borders, while the United States
has such a place of influence in the nation. 130
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This dispute is yet another layer on top of the many layered and complicated
situation that is the allied occupation of Afghanistan. Many mining experts agree on two
points, that the mineral wealth, if properly managed, could do wonders for the Afghan
economy, and secondly, that a multitude of factors makes that unlikely to happen. First
of all, the Afghans lack the infrastructure to allow profitable mining, such as electricity
and railroads. Secondly, the territory identified as mineral rich is currently held by the
Taliban, near the Helmand river, presenting security concerns, and political concerns as
to where the mineral wealth will goes once it is mined from the earth, and what
concessions will the Taliban expect for allowing the exploitation of their mineral wealth.
Mining is a water intensive industry, and Afghanistan has precious little water as it is,
and what little water they do have is channeled into small scale irrigation for agriculture.
Major mining operations could bring the nation to its knees with thirst and hunger.131, 132
Corruption is already rampant in Afghanistan, ranked 179th in the world
according to the Corruption Perceptions Index. As demonstrated by Nigeria and other
states, and written about in the 2009 Transparency International Global Corruption
Report, “countries relying on oil and mining revenues tend, with surprisingly few
exceptions, to be poor, badly run and prone to violent instability: the infamous resource
curse.”133 A sudden influx of resource wealth often dooms a nation to decades of
corruption, poverty, and infighting. If somehow this was to be avoided, Dutch Disease
would surely ensue. Afghanistan is not a manufacturing powerhouse, but as such, it
would detrimentally affect the agricultural sector, which employs three in four Afghans,
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and makes up a third of their economic growth. Afghani agriculture is fragile as it is, due
to decades of insecurity. As these factors are already present in Afghanistan, they would
be greatly exacerbated if large scale mining was attempted in the near future. 134
Canada‟s Hoidas Lake project has some of the largest potential to challenge China
for supremacy in producing at least some rare earths, but due to its remote location, and
slow investment, the project is considered behind most other ventures. Other North
American ventures include a Canadian funded venture in Nebraska‟s Pea Ridge Mine,
and the Kvanejfeld project in southern Greenland. Pea Ridge mine however, is
converting back to iron production, and the Kvanejfeld project is still in the exploratory
stages, and suffers many of the remoteness issues of the Hoidas Lake project. In North
America, the only current player of note in Molycorp, the current owner of the Mountain
Pass Mine. Molycorp Inc. went public, and has at least technically re-opened the mine,
dormant since 2002.
Molycorp successfully raised more than $500 million in private investment in
order to re-open the mine at the beginning of 2011. 135 Molycorp is heralded as the savior
of the United States, with numerous endorsements from politicians, and optimistic
projections that have the company meeting American demand by the end of the decade.
Most industry experts, however, expect meaningful production to be at least five
years away, 136 and other complications exist as well. With the migration of many
industries that rely on rare earth metals to China, a domestic market for certain
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minerals currently doesn‟t exist to support the expansion of the Molycorp mine. 137
Furthermore, the United States doesn‟t have any rare earth refinery capabilities, or any
emerging on the horizon. Such a refinery would cost over 1 billion US dollars to build, a
weighty sum that private investors seem unwilling to stomach.138 While relying on an
Australian run refinery is more geopolitically reliable than Chinese refineries, it is
neither practical nor cost efficient to ship the minerals half way around the world, only
to have them sent back.
Another large problem with Molycorp‟s Mountain Pass Mine is the content of the
mine. The California mine can produce a competitive amount of several light rare earth
metals, but is virtually lacking in heavy rare earth metals, the type needed in most
military technologies. This doesn‟t allow the United States break the monopoly of
several of the most highly sought rare earths.
Molycorp, furthermore, has other problems. Since raising large amounts of
capital to open the mine in a large show of industry support and development, the now
publicly traded Molycorp stock is plummeting. The mining company‟s stock lost over
30% of its value in the last few months of 2011, and is now trading below $40 a share. 140
A telling sign of things to come, insiders are leaving the company in droves. Despite a
strong press presence, the company is taking too few concrete steps to re-assure
investors of the financial future of the company. One fourth of the original investors
have left the organization, and many don‟t expect the company to meet its proclaimed
goals.141
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Section Five: What Now?
Further troubling news is the rate of consumption. For example, reserves of
indium are limited, and a 2007 study found that at current rates of consumption, known
reserves of indium would last just thirteen years.142 This trend is common across other
rare earth metal supply chains, such as gallium, where demand from emerging green
tech would substantially raise demand beyond the level of world production today.
Demand for gallium would increase six fold by 2030, as well as large increases in the
demand for other rare earths. Overall, the global rare earth shortage is likely to widen in
the coming years due to cuts in production and exports by China. Numerically, supply
stands at 156,200 tons, while demand stands at 177,200 tons. The production picture is
much more complicated than simple tons of rare earths produced, as the supply of
different minerals varies widely. 143
The current solutions to the rare earth shortage are either uninspiring, failed, or
insufficient.
As rare earth metals remain relatively expensive on the commodity markets,
many projects have come together worldwide to attempt to break the Chinese
monopoly. Over 200 mines are supposed to open by 2025, but the likelihood that this
actually happens is highly questionable. As with Molycorp, the barriers to new mines are
steep. A study by longtime industry expert Jack Lifton explains that about four percent
of new companies or less than ten of the 244 companies that have launched in the last
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three years will succeed.144 With so many companies starting up, there simply isn‟t
enough expertise to go around, leaving many companies with investors, and ore, but
nobody to do anything with the rocks they pull out of the ground, or even to point out
which rocks they should be extracting. Each mine is chemically different, exacerbating
the problem.145 The other primary barrier to startups remains refining capability, which
resides solely in China until the Lynas refinery gets on its feet (Even then, the Lynas
refinery is primarily designed to process Australian production of rare earths) . "The
choke point for all the companies is the question of what they can do with the
concentrated REM ore once it's above ground.”146 Lifton explained that “without
separation capacity, all you have is a loss-making ore concentrate company."147
A barrier for entry, even to forming a mining company is the cost. "The capital
costs are staggering for setting up mining, refining operations and infrastructure,”148
Lifton explains. Convincing a collection of investors to put their money against the
government based corporations in China isn‟t an easy sell. Investors like short term
returns, something that rare earth mining, which takes anywhere from five to fifteen
years to turn profitable, is not. Most investors don‟t want to wait a generation until their
wealth begins to generate returns.149, 150
In the end, China will still control 100 percent of the market for three heavy rare
earths; dysprosium, terbium and yttrium. These are some of the most in-demand
metals, and significant sources outside of China haven‟t been discovered in
commercially viable quantities as of yet. New mines in other countries aren‟t ideal for
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military supply chains, as they can be coerced or cut off.151
Even more troubling is that China is not just reducing exports to fuel domestic
demand, and to reduce environmental problems.152 Furthermore, they are actively
collecting a standing reserve of rare earth metals.153 This could allow the Chinese to
flood the market with rare earth metals to collapse the high prices for rare earths,
putting competitors, who aren‟t supported by government subsidies, out of business
quickly, and re-assert their control.154 “China succeeded in driving others out of business
once, and many fear that it could do it again.”155
The US Department of Energy predicts that, given the multiple substantial
barriers to breaking the dependence on China for rare earths.156 “It could take 15 years
to break America‟s dependence on Chinese supplies”157
Another feasible option besides building new mines is recycling, which makes
logical sense given the extreme scarcity of some of the metals.158 As usual though, cost
and the will to do so remain seemingly omnipotent barriers that bar the way for effective
recycling programs. Currently, less than 1% of the world‟s rare earth metals are recycled,
according to the UN Environmental Program.159 This is especially disturbing given that
other metals are recycled anywhere from 25%-75% of the time. Japan is the pioneer
here, engaging in what they call “urban mining.” This unique practice, involving
combing through trash dumps and landfills for precious metals in used electronics, is
probably the best thing for the environment, re-using minerals that have already been
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mined. Urban mining, however, without a public awareness program that actively
encourages the citizenry to recycle their electronics, is very expensive, and doesn‟t result
in the volume necessary, for example, to break Japan of its dependence on its largest
geo-political competitor, China.160
Many hurdles exist to recycling programs in general, some of which are
unavoidable. Some rare earth metals simply get used up, and dissipate, so there isn‟t
anything left to recycle. If the metals haven‟t dissipated, recycling and reprocessing
metals of this fashion isn‟t an area that has had many technological breakthroughs, so
the technology may not even exist yet. The metals that are least likely to dissipate are
often used in products that are expected to last for years like cars, solar panels, and wind
turbines. Recycling when possible is obviously an environmentally friendly method of
retrieving some rare earth metals, but can‟t be done in the volume or-for some metals-at
all, needed to replace mining, or importing from China. 161
If the metals are so hard to get, why use them? Some scientists are approaching
the rare earth shortage looking for substitutions that are more easily accessed. The
trouble is there are reasons that companies use rare earths instead of currently available
materials. For some rare earths, there are no known substitutes. The lanthanides, for
example, have unique chemical and magnetic capabilities that make them luminescent
and effective at radioactive shielding that just haven‟t been found in any other
elements.162 Of the substitutes that do exist, they often come up short.163
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The largest barrier to rare earth metal substitution is that the metals are often
preferred to other materials is their miniaturization abilities, which are critical to
making electronics small, without losing effectiveness. (Rare earth metals allowed
computers to go from requiring their own rooms in buildings and their own air
conditioning to a device in a backpack, placed on a lap, or largely replaceable by a cell
phone.) 164
An area that might have promise sometime down the road, once the technology
can catch up, are synthetic substitutes. Researchers in the Netherlands believe that they
have created a replacement for indium, with negligible loss in chemical properties. The
cost of synthetically creating replacements on a large scale is daunting, but if the
demand was high, the price might drop significantly. 165
An idea that originated in Congress is the idea to copy China, and create an
American Rare Earth Stockpile. Currently, the United States has reserves of critical
resources like oil, which can be used to protect economic stability and to defend against
embargoes, at least for a short time. Rare earth elements are not currently on this list of
critical resources.166 The most obvious problem is that if there is a shortage, stockpiling
will both make the shortage worse, and is difficult to do, given the lack of available
resources.167 Additionally, experts predict that a cascade effect is likely to occur if the
U.S. starts a rare earth stockpile. If one nation starts, other nations will have little choice
but to follow suit, making a fragile supply and demand system collapse.168
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It seems that one of the primary ways to end our reliance is to work with nations
outside China to build up their mining, and refining capabilities. While this doesn‟t stop
high tech jobs from going overseas, it does diversify where they are going, and reduce
the geo-political implications of the Chinese monopoly. Currently, longtime U.S. ally
Australia is the leading non-Chinese producer of rare earth metals. President Obama
recognizes this, and during a recent visit to Australia to inaugurate a new military base,
he also secured commitments from the Australian government for rare earth supplies in
the event of a crisis.
Other allies such as India and South Africa are increasing their production, but
would be less likely to give the US specific concession on rare earth metals. Nations such
as Vietnam (and India) are increasing their supplies, but these have been at least partly
promised in multilateral treaties (in this case with Japan). While production is being
attempted in several nations in central Africa, “the competition for them (there) has
fueled conflicts that have taken the lives of millions of civilians.”169
While the rest of the world seeks a solution for the rare earth question, fears of
China‟s intentions are growing. Commodity market speculators see the boom in
competition for rare earths as an economic race that could re-define the global winners
and losers. Few doubt that this rare earth race is happening, but the disagreement exists
on China‟s intentions. Some, such as John Daly, a clean tech speculator, believe that
while the „West‟ has feared malevolent action by the Chinese government, they have
performed as “ a responsible member of the global economic community.”170
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Such optimism is very hard to justify, given recent events. China has flexed its
muscle in international diplomatic sphere much more in the last few years, and, when
challenged, hasn‟t hesitated to use whatever tools necessary to achieve favorable ends.
Specifically concerning rare earth metals, on September 7th, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat
was captured by Japanese naval patrols. The dispute erupted into an argument over the
maritime borders of the two nations in the South China Sea. As the argument raged,
state sponsored Chinese companies stopped exporting rare earth metals to Japan.171, 172
The Japanese relented, and released the captain, a disturbing example of the political
and economic power of rare earth metals. Such manipulation is the basis of a trade war
that would, if it was between major players in the global economy, wreak havoc on trade
patterns.173
Further worrying is the temporary export cut that happened in October 2011.
China, declaring that they needed to preserve reserves for domestic consumption,
instructed Baotou Steal Rare Earth, the world‟s largest rare earth company, to stop
exporting rare earths for a month. This shocked global prices, and, according to the
House Armed Services Committee, served as a “wakeup call” to add urgency to the drive
to find new sources of rare earths.174 The export ban was strategic, and likely telling of
what China would ultimately like to see the global economy look like. Exports were only
cut of unprocessed and raw materials, meaning that if a company wanted to buy rare
earths, they could buy the finished products (phones, solar panels, etc.) from China, as
the only remaining source.175 Baotou issued a statement, saying that they cut exports for
40

a month to “stabilise the market and balance supply and demand,” likely an attempt to
consolidate its control over its domestic rare earth industry, and shoot a shot across the
bow of the hundreds of companies striving to join the sector.176
These recent actions by the People‟s Republic of China have brought the issue to
the forefront, and with no clear solution in sight, highlight the complicated US China
relationship.
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Section Six: A New Consensus?
The United States finds itself entering the second decade of the 21st century in a
tumultuous world. Economic instability, international terrorism, the Arab Spring, failed
states, political partisanship and environmental catastrophes (Oil spills in the Gulf, and
the Tsunami that hit Japan, to name the largest) have policymakers and scholars on
edge. With the present uncertain, its small wonder that structural problems such as the
collapse of the American, and indeed, the world‟s non-Chinese rare earth sector have
been ignored. Recent events have brought the US relationship with China into sharper
focus, as the search for solutions continues.
The rare earth dilemma represents a perfect example of the largest source of
competition that currently grips the world. Occurring in virtually every capital across
the world, traditional notions of the structure of the international system are being
challenged, and in some places, new institutions and concepts are emerging. This
competition is a war of ideas, and the United States is the inadvertently on the
defensive, as the Chinese advance across every continent. 177
In 1992, Francis Fukuyama wrote a “The End of History and the Last Man,” an
expansion of his 1989 essay titled “The End of History,” where he argued that, in a
catchphrase, that the West had won the Cold War, and there was no possible alternative
to liberalism.178 With the victory of the United States and its allies (of many shapes,
sizes, and political affiliations) the ideas that shaped the allies, and the ideology that
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they advanced throughout the Cold War was now inevitable. The liberal economic and
democratic model of governance had won, and it was only a matter of time until this
became the final and only form of state in the world. This essay, and others of published
around the same time, agreed that the international sphere would be defined by this
combined liberal capitalist free market ideology, combined with democratic transitions,
regardless of culture, history of democracy, or other factors.
This ideology, sometimes referred to as the Washington Consensus, is the
foundational ideology behind much of the world‟s international bodies, and has been a
dominant construct in foreign policy over the last fifty years. Institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, aspects of the United Nations, the
World Trade Organization, and numerous other international bodies are all rooted in
the ideological consensus that came from a western victory in the Cold War.179 The
United States, and other western states, and international financial bodies, have
especially been responsible for espousing these beliefs. Decades of underdeveloped
nations seeking foreign aid were told to convert to democracy, and embrace capitalism,
free markets, and to reduce social safety nets, subsidies, and other tariffs.180 Other
conditions such as human rights reform and other more “moralistic” requirements often
accompanied the economic and political requirements. These changes were the
conditions of foreign assistance which many nations desperately needed, and many
complied. Those who resisted were often labeled pariah states, left of the mainstream
international dialogue.181 This consensus gave rise to various liberal ideas of
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international relations, since if all states were gathering democratically with similar
values, international organizations could have a great influence, and also produced
several theories of international politics, such as “Democratic Peace” theory. 182
Rare earth metals have a curious way of poking a significant hole in this
consensus. A democratic populous doesn‟t often think beyond their immediate pocket
book needs, or what social or international issues that can be framed as important when
the economy is strong. This short sightedness is at the root of the lack of planning by the
US government on this issue. More importantly, the economic model supported by the
“Washington Consensus” revealed the dual weakness in the model.
Extremely free and open markets where every nation specializes in what they are
best at producing in the most efficient and profitable manner aren‟t very effective for
national defense. Energy, weapons, and many other supposed critical industries would
be outsourced, and while they would be done more effectively, they wouldn‟t be
controllable by a specific nation in a time of crisis, allowing nations to utilize the
imbalances and dependencies in international trade for aggressive purposes. Completely
open markets, are therefore, not actually considered realistic in any school of
international relations, especially not the dominant realist paradigm that focuses on the
competition between states.
Therefore, if a free market doesn‟t actually guarantee security or the perception of
it in the international stage, what has the response been by states intent on maintaining
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domestic control over key industries? Governments have by and large ensured that key
sectors of the nation, such as the military industrial base, some energy, food, water, and
other industries remain profitable and based in their state. In the event of trouble, a
nation wants to ensure its basic functions remain intact. The main method of ensuring
that these industries remain in the nation are government subsidies, or other forms of
support that are cleverly disguised to avoid reprimand by international free trade bodies
such as the World Trade Organization. Examples of this include state ownership of oil or
natural gas companies, such as Mexico and Russia, subsidies to farmers in most
countries, most notably the United States, and numerous military contracts and
investments shrouded as classified for “national security.” The modern concept of these
critical pieces of infrastructure is expanding to include large corporations, the internet,
and a host of other sectors. The expansion of the protection of these industries doesn‟t
jive with the rhetoric of politicians who advocate a “free market” economy, or advocates
of strict capitalism. The “Washington Consensus” therefore, has increasingly become
much more talk, and much less walk. 183
The hypocrisy of this stance has emerged in the form of the People‟s Republic of
China. China has set out to demonstrate its combination of relatively open economics
and close state control, combining the power of the state to further mostly free market
ends as being both quite effective, and lacking the moralistic conditions of western
powers and international financial institutions.184 The financial crisis has given China
the opportunity to more openly express the ideological position that it has been
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espousing for many years; the west may have been right about reasonably free markets,
but state dominance of the political system works wonderfully, and that all of the feel
good conditions that western powers have the luxury of demanding are not necessary.
There is finally an alternative. Foreign investment now flows from both east and west,
and the Chinese often offer a better product with fewer strings attached.
This direct challenge to the current international order encompasses the various
and competing concepts of “the rise of China.” Several schools of thought exist, often
tied to particular ideological traditions, think tanks, or have other obvious interests
involved when they offer their analysis of what the rise of China will look like, and how
the United States should engage it.185 These schools of thought range from those who
see Chinese military growth as a direct challenge to US hegemony, and as an attempt to
gain military parity with the United States. Others see the economic competition, using
any and all means to steal the advantage from the United States, whether it be supposed
currency manipulation to using its advantage in rare earth mining and government
incentives to lure high tech manufacturing from around the world to China, building
things from solar panels and satellites to computers and televisions. 186
This competition is founded in a realist interpretation of international relations,
as are the above mentioned solutions to the rare earth crisis. Of particular note is the
language used to describe them are couched in a realist mindset, combined with a bit of
the American liberal tradition of strong alliances with certain other states. From an
American perspective, the way we‟ve been engaging the international community has
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been inadequate to respond to the challenges of the 21st century, with rare earth metals
serving as a microcosm of the long term trends for which the United States currently has
no concrete answers. From the transition toward a green economy and energy
dependence challenges, the continued occupation of Afghanistan, and the largest
challenge of all, the “rise of China,” rare earth metals display the problems with and
short sighted nature of US policy. China is the source of the world‟s rare earth minerals
for the foreseeable future, and the home to both a growing amount of the world‟s
polluters and green tech manufacturers. To properly create a coherent rare earth policy,
the U.S. China relationship must be re-examined.
Realism, considered the dominant and inevitable window through which to view
and craft matters of state, that focuses on the interaction of states with other states, and
less so on smaller actors, as well as the actions of states in the pursuit of their defined
“national interests.” At a very basic level, the very idea that the United States sees the
existence of a monopoly in the rare earth sector based out of another country as a threat
cements them in a realist or even neo-realist mindset. Other examples include the
United States‟ desire to create a national reserve for rare earth metals, to maintain vital
economic and military sectors in the event of an embargo or conflict, and the focus on
inter-state relationships for a solution to primarily an economic issue. This raises the
fundamental question, how does the United States view China, and how does this
discourse and these representations constrain American thinking? And how does the
American perspective of China affect how the Chinese respond to the United States?
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Theorist Stephen Walt addresses several problems with the current study of
security threats, citing among other problems a lack of short term analysis based on the
desires and whims of those who fund the research done by security theorists, and overly
mathematical analysis that remove the human element from international
relationships.187 Furthermore, the politicization of research has hampered developments
in many fields. This is especially true of the rare earth metal quandary, as it gets
absorbed by the traditional grand strategy views of the U.S. relationship to China.188
Walt‟s starting premise in “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” however, is one of the
many reasons that traditional realists have been unable to come up with satisfactory
answers to the rare earth conundrum. Walt argues that strictly military threats should
be the focus of scholars, and other threats should be seen as of less important, for the
coherence of the field of security studies. Rare earths strike at the heart of the problems
with his analysis. Rare earths are critical for many modern military technologies, and
project to become an even more important role in the future, yet as a resource, they are
seen as an economic issue, not a military issue. The military can‟t fight without guns,
and similarly, security can‟t be understood simply by looking at whom to point your
guns at, and should instead include a broader array of considerations, at least protecting
the supply chains for critical technologies, and perhaps other concerns, such as energy
dependence, and economic stability; large potential triggers of military conflict. Now
that the price of rare earths are increasing, and there is talk of scarcity, the defense
industrial base, and their allied scholarly community have been some of the first into the
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fray, demanding new solutions to the rare earth dilemma, the creation of stockpiles, and
the increase in domestic mining. A longer term analysis and a broader look at what
constitutes a threat would prevent this scramble, before it becomes a major problem. 189
Another flaw with realism relates to its intensive focus on the interactions
between states. Modern challenges, ranging from terrorism, immigration, economic
crimes, cyber warfare, human trafficking, and the drug trade are not necessarily caused,
or solved entirely by state to state interactions. Rare earth metals are technically owned
by Chinese corporations, not the state itself, and as seen in Afghanistan, these
corporations are scouring the world to increase their holdings. The large question with
China becomes, where the state stops, and the governing boards of large corporations
begin.
Other schools of international relations would encourage more engagement with
the international sphere, and international institutions. Concerning rare earth metals,
this might result in anything from a global reserve to an institution for regulating its
trade. The unequal dispersal of critical resources around the world creates uneven
distributions of economic and political power, and a little human nature and greed
results an unwillingness to share. No nation will ever impoverish themselves to “spread
the wealth,” but international cooperation via international institutions is a potential
avenue to address questions of inequality and the potential problems stemming from a
critical resource monopoly.
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The primary problem with international institutions is their inability to either
coerce or cajole via incentives cooperation with the will or norm of international forums.
This holds doubly true for world powers. The United Nations isn‟t equipped to handle
resource monopolies, and given its structure and the absolute veto power wielded on the
Security Council by the People‟s Republic of China, this is an unlikely source of
resolution. Other bodies are equally ineffective, or ill-equipped to handle the problem. If
any economy had a central position and role in the world economy and its possible
hierarchy of centers, it is China.”190 This has proven true, with oil embargoes going
unanswered by international institutions.
But what of the bilateral relationship between China and the United States? This
relationship has gotten a lot of attention in the media in the last year, as legislation in
congress sought trade restrictions against China, labeling it a currency manipulator.
This debate largely rotated around the construction that the PRC is an enemy of the
United States. A media storm that centers on the “big bad China” who is trying to
subvert the American economy isn‟t just contained to our shores. Chinese America
specialists look at domestic media and listen to American politicians speak, and must
have felt accused, targeted and belittled. The ways in which the debate concerning China
is portrayed in the United States is a decisive factor in how the Chinese view the United
States, so the construction of a China threat may actually become a reality.191
All of this discourse focuses on a single overarching factor; the creation of an “Us”
and “Them” separation. Modern “politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of
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conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an “us” by the
determination of a “them”.”192 This categorization is the basis of modern US Chinese
relations, defined as a comparison of two unique (one familiar and the other mysterious
and foreign) political entities. In the status quo, the realist lens identifies this dichotomy
as a productive portrayal of the bilateral relations. Clearly defined threats are helpful for
the analysis of realists, but often results in threats being created rather than identified.
The way that scholars in the United States construct China as a threat is very
pervasive. Reading scholarly literature on the U.S-China relationship is virtually
encompassed by "China threat" literature, dichotomizing the West as the self, and the
People‟s Republic of China as a distant „other.‟ Originally, this discourse was
perpetuated to bolster the dual ideas of American Exceptionalism, and American
hegemony in a post-Cold War era.
This discursive construction, however, has deeper roots, that go back a century
and a half to the first wave of Chinese immigration to the United States. Chinese
laborers took jobs that the new settlers in California, and the rest of western America
desperately needed. Their willingness to work for less undercut many middle and lower
class jobs, and resulted in a resentment that translated into blatant racism.193 A perfect
example is the construction of the transcontinental railroad by a mostly Chinese
workforce. The Chinese exclusion acts limited Chinese, and Asian immigration as a
whole shortly thereafter, but the damage was done. The United States has been
threatened economically by the Chinese for centuries, whether in person by the loss of
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jobs in the United States, or the more abstract threat of a large, foreign nation having a
position of power over American currency, and now, vital resources.194 This largely
orientalist construction of the Chinese has its roots in an imperialist mindset that
denigrates non-Westerners.195 Many of our conceptions of the Chinese as sneaky,
manipulative (such as in relation to the US currency, and now, our rare earth supplies)
and militaristic (such as interpretations of their military programs as a challenge to the
U.S.) are imbedded in what Edward Said described as “orientalism.”196 This semipaternal, semi racist mindset subtly makes actions by the PRC as threatening, because
of who is doing them, and translates into how we view actions by the Chinese.197 “Like
orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China
acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction.” 198
This has created a self-fulfilling prophecy.199 The realist quest for security has
another casualty, for “so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on
the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough”
to overcome these constructions.200
The United States has always constructed itself as against someone as a leading
part of its identity. The early colonists opposed the Native Americans, then the British.
Soon after the British was the Western Native Americans, and moral crusade against
slavery. The United States turned its newfound moral authority against imperialism,
even though it began a series of imperialist wars and occupations. Two World Wars later
left the United States locked in a titanic ideological and, in many nations, violent conflict
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with the Soviet Union and Communism. “After the demise of the Soviet Union, the
vacancy of other was to be filled by China, the "best candidate" the United States could
find in the post-Cold War, unipolar world.”201 “Only an uncertainty with potentially
global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued
world dominance.”202
Many analysts who claim expertise on the Chinese have a problem identifying
who “the Chinese” are, and what their self identity really is. The Han ethnic group is
dominant in China, but is really an amalgamation of many groups, as being “Han” has
social implications in China. But the Chinese nation isn‟t about being a specific ethnic
group, it‟s about heritage. The Chinese see themselves as a rightful world power, whose
empire was the envy of centuries of neighboring states. Thus, when the United States
describes the 21st century as potentially defined by the “rise of China,” a Chinese scholar
would likely correct them, describing it as the “re-emergence of China” to its proper
place on the world stage. 203
Thankfully, the realization of how the domestic constructions of the United States
affect how other nations, specifically China, see them is seeping slowly into the
mainstream of China analysts, but this discourse is still seeped with orientalist logic.205
Robert Kagan describes how “The Chinese leadership may already believe the United
States is its enemy, for instance, and there is nothing we can do to change that. Partly
this is due to our actions -- such as the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese military
alliance, which began during the Clinton administration, and our recent efforts to
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enhance strategic ties with India.”204
Sadly, he goes on to say that the Chinese opposition to the United States rests in “
our different forms of government, since autocratic rulers naturally feel threatened by a
democratic superpower and its democratic allies”205
The focus on China relates to the perceptions that China has the necessary
elements to contradict the „western way‟ of doing things in the international sphere; that
“contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm.206 In an era of supposed
universalizing cosmopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and persistence of
nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions of
democracy and capitalism.207 China has the technocratic and pragmatist qualities that
the west values most in itself, but uses them to portray a world made in a different
image than the American liberal vision.208 Contrary to the assertions of Fukuyama that
the end of the Cold War was the end of ‟history,‟ “China is a reminder that history is not
close to an end” 209
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Section Seven: The Way Forward
The rare earth conundrum isn‟t going anywhere. Chinese domination of the
means of production is here to stay, efforts to solve them in the status quo like recycling,
substitution, and mining abroad aren‟t going to cut it. The United States needs to move
past the ideological notion that they, or any other state, is really a “free market
economy,” and start protecting and supporting its domestic rare earth mining
capabilities, and build its own rare earth refinery. Changing the public notions that a
“freer” economy isn‟t necessarily a better economy is a difficult battle, and will require
dedicated leadership, with a clearly articulated message. In the mean time, President
Obama should expand his diplomatic efforts to secure the rare earth trade with friendly
nations, such as Canada and Australia, and promote recycling of rare earths and
research into substitution. This would compliment his message of green energy and the
new “green economy.”
The short term solution, and the root cause of the problem lies with the bilateral
relationship with China. If nothing else, focusing on this relationship could buy other
solutions to the rare earth question time to come to fruition. The United States needs to
re-evaluate how they view China, and embrace a more cosmopolitan ethic to move past
its Orientalist assumptions. Embracing such an ethic would allow the United States to
move past the political dialogues that construct China as the foreign menace, looming
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across the Pacific Ocean. Instead of viewing our relationship in terms of cooperation or
competition, the United States should embrace a policy of respect. The United States
wants to be treated with respect from China, and can‟t claim the moral high ground in
the international sphere until our actions support our desires. Recognizing that China
not an emerging power such as Brazil, and is a re-emerging power, such as Germany or
Japan after World War Two, instead of a pesky third world nation that wants its day in
the sun, and treating it as such would go a long way towards stable and peaceful
relations. Rare earth metals have the potential to re-shape the international order, and
have already played an instrumental role in the ways in which humans interact with one
another, and respond to global challenges. The peaceful, respectful development of this
maligned sector of the economy is in the interest of everyone. If the cycle persists, it will
only create a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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